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Comment and Casenotes
RECENT MARYLAND STATUTORY CHANGE IN
RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS ARISING UNDER
FOREIGN WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
The 1947 session of the General Assembly of Maryland
completed another stage in the development of the Maryland attitude toward the enforcement of foreign wrongful
death statutes. The new section provides that
"Any person who is entitled to bring suit under the
laws of the jurisdiction wherein the wrongful death
occurred may bring suit in Maryland upon proof of
his qualifications and authority."'
This attitude of comity, based on sound principles of
preserving "privileges and immunities" for citizens of other
states, is a far cry from the position of the law of Maryland
on the subject not much more than a decade ago. In the
case of Davis v. Ruzicka,2 the administrator of a decedent's
estate in the District of Columbia sought to recover in a
Maryland court upon a wrongful death occurring in the
District of Columbia. In accordance with the District
statute, the suit was brought in the name of the personal
representative for the benefit of the estate of the decedent.
The Court pointed out, that in Maryland, suit for wrongful
death is instituted in the name of the State for the benefit
of certain dependents. These, among other dissimilarities,
the Court held, were so great,
that the Maryland Court
3
would not entertain the suit.
This attitude, it has been observed,4 did not reflect the
growing tendency elsewhere of recognition of the rights
of a citizen of one state to enter another jurisdiction and
sue under a foreign wrongful death statute on the principle
that the action was essentially a "common law" action and
should not be barred because of the particular form in
which it was brought. As if in answer to the plea of the
1

Md. Laws, 1947, Ch. 740, creating Sec. 2 A of Art. 67.

170 Md. 112, 183 A. 569 (1936) ;cert. denied, 298 U. S. 671 (1936).
See also London, Etc. Co. v. Steamship Co., 161 Md. 145, 155 A.
334 (1931).
' Note, Action in Maryland for Wrongful Death Caused and Occurring
Elsewhere (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 162.
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writer of the casenote 5 that a statute be passed "permitting
suits to be brought in Maryland to collect damages for the
wrongful death of persons occurring elsewhere", the legislature acted upon the subject in 1937.( Basically, the effect
of the 1937 statute was to provide, that, in an action in
courts of this State for wrongful death occurring outside
the State, the substantive law of the place of the wrongful
death should apply in Maryland; though, for very expedient
reasons, our procedural rules were to obtain.
The Federal District Court for the District of Maryland
seemingly anticipated the effect of this statute; for, in a
case decided after the passage of the act, but before its
effective date,7 it held that the wrongful death statute of
Virginia, which was similar to that of the District of Columbia, even to the extent of several of the features which had
been the basis of the decision in the Davis case," was not
so dissimilar to the Maryland statute as to preclude suit
in a federal court in Maryland under the Virginia statute
for a death which had occurred in Virginia.' This decision
was reached, it should be noted, before the pronouncement
of the Erie Railroad v. Tcnmpkins'" rule, but, despite the
citation of earlier federal precedent," knowledge of the
passage of the 1937 act may have been a considered factor
in the conclusion reached.
Thus, once the "dissimilarity of statute" problem had
been dissipated, way was made for the consideration of the
problem of "who may sue". The 1937 statute1 2 was silent
on this subject. In the Rose case,' 3 it was pointed out, that,
while the plaintiff would have been allowed to maintain
suit in Maryland even had she not taken out ancillary
letters of administration because effectively she sued as
trustee for dependents or a preferred class of relatives, the
general rule was that a foreign administrator is restricted
by the nature of his office to action within the borders of
his own jurisdiction.'"
5 Ibid.

Md. Laws, 1937, Ch. 495, creating Sec. 1 A, the present Sec. 2 of Art. 67.
June 1, 1937.
S Supra, n. 2.
9 Rose v. Phillips Packing Co., Inc., 21 F. Sup. 485 (D. Md., 1937).
10 304 U. S. 64 (1938), noted (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 263.
21 Note Weissengoff v. Davis, 260 F. 16 (C. C. A- 4th, 1919), cert. denied,
250 U. S. 674.
12 Supra, n. 6.

Supra, n. 9.
14 See Note, Who May Sue for Wrongful Death Cau8ed and Occurring

Outside the State of the Forum (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 168.
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The 1947 statute provided not only (as hereinabove indicated) that, generally, any person who could sue under
the laws of the jurisdiction where the wrongful death
occurred could sue in Maryland, but also that:
"If the laws of the State wherein the wrongful death
occurred provide for suit to be brought in the name
of the State, District or Territory, as the case may be,
then suit may be brought in Maryland in the name
of this State on behalf of the beneficiaries protected
under the foreign statute.' ' 15
In this respect, the legislature had made great strides in
resolving the problem of "who may sue", and in providing
a method of suit not only desirable from the standpoint of
comity, but necessary in certain cases for providing remedial justice where it might otherwise be denied. Perhaps more with a view to "remedial justice" than to comity,
the legislature added the following restriction:
"The provisions of this statute shall not in any way
be construed to apply to actions in which service of
process can be obtained in the jurisdiction where the
16
cause of action arose or where the Plaintiff resides.'
It has been suggested that this limitation has no effect
upon those who might have sued under the statute as it
stood prior to 1947. Primarily, then, this limitation acts
as a bar, in the provisional instances mentioned, to suit
by foreign administrators for the benefit of the decedent's
estate (at least to those who, in effect, do not sue as
trustees) for wrongful death occurring outside the State
of Maryland. To those who hope to resolve many of the
problems of the conflict of laws by increased tolerance on
the part of the courts of one state for the laws of another,
this limitation constitutes a "joker", an extra feature that
dissipates somewhat the effect of the purpose of the act. It
is true that the inclusion of this restrictive provision presents a new problem in the form of interpretation to a
subject that was gradually becoming less problematical,
but it may be viewed as an effort to restrain the overburdening of our courts in cases where adequate remedy is
available elsewhere.
To what extent is this limitation constitutional?
Courts have generally been reluctant to apply the statutory law of another state. While the maxim that lex loci
25

Supra, n. 1.

16 1bid.
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delicti governs is usually followed as to the "common
law" of another state," foreign statutes are seldom followed.'" While the Supreme Court has said that the law
of the state in which the wrong occurs governs, 9 it has
not stated that a refusal to recognize such law would constitute a denial of due process.20 Moreover, the question of
whether or not one state must apply the statute of a foreign
state is as yet undetermined. 2 ' Cook states that "it is well
settled that under the present Act of Congress in regard
to full faith and credit, no state is required to recognize as
constituting causes of action groups of fact so recognized
the operative facts
by the law of other states, even though
22
... occurred in these other states.
Attention has been called to the fact that, while the
Constitution of the United States provides that "full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
23
records and judicial proceedings of every other state",
the enabling act of Congress provided only that "the records
and judicial proceedings" of any state or territory "shall
have such faith and credit given to them in every court
within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the state from which they are taken".2 4
The significance of the Congressional omission of "the
public acts" has been speculated upon by the writers."
Indeed, it is thought that the intention of the Constitutional
Convention was to give Congress power to prescribe in
some measure the effect to be given the public acts of
another state. 26 It is pointed out, however, that the Constitutional provision was probably not meant to be selfexecuting.
Generally, it has been held that the statute of one state
is not law in another, even though that statute created a
17 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10, n. 3, cases cited.

"sIt is to be noted carefully that this paper does not consider the subject
of the faith and credit to be given to judgments bas d on foreign law.
Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U. S. 387 (1933).
20 Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in?.
the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533.
21 Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause

(1919) 28 Yale L. J. 421, 432; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts (1930) 24 Ili. L. Rev. 383, 421. See also subject
comment, L. R. A. 1915 F. 955 and Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 44
A. 538 (1899).
2- Cook, supra, n. 21, 432.
23 U. S. CoNsT., Art. 4, Sec. 1 (underscoring added).
21 28 U. S. C. A. 687.

(1936)
25 Ross, Full Faith and Credit in a Federal System
Rev. 140; Cook, supra, n. 21.
2 Cook, supra, n. 21, 433.

20 Minn. L.

27 Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit

Clause (1928)

12 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 442; Langmaid, supra, n. 21, 389.
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right or obligation, which, if transitory, would theoretically
be enforceable wherever the person of the wrongdoer could
be found.2" As it is sometimes stated, "a statute, ex proprio
vigore, can have no extraterritorial force or effect", 29 and
a state legislature does not intend its acts to have effect
beyond the territorial limits of its own jurisdiction. "°
It should be pointed out, however, that where a state
statute creates a transitory action which is but a codified
version of pre-existent "general common law", such state
cannot restrict suit on the right so codified to courts of
its own jurisdiction. 1
On the other hand, there have been cases in which it
has been held that the Constitution requires that full faith
32
and credit be given 'to the public acts of other states.
Examination of these cases would indicate that they are
primarily cases involving the particular problems of insurance and fraternal benefits, workmen's compensation and
stockholders' liability; and the law, even as to these subjects, has varied.
However, the restriction contained in the Maryland
statute under discussion does not deal specifically with
these particular subjects, and would probably be upheld
if a proper test of its constitutionality ever arose.
In the words of the late Justice Brandeis, the Constitutional obligation of full faith and credit "does not require
enforcement of every right conferred by a statute of another state. There is room for some play of conflicting
policies. Thus, a plaintiff suing in New Hampshire on a
statutory cause of action arising in Vermont might be
denied relief because the forum fails to provide a court
with jurisdiction of the controversy; ... or.. . fails to provide procedure appropriate to its determination, . . . or
because . . .enforcement . . .would be obnoxious to the
11 Cohen v. Penn. Casualty Co., 183 Md. 340, 38 A. (2d) 86 (1944) ; See
also Reisig v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, 182 Md. 432,
34 A. (2d) 842 (1943), involving the statute not of another "state", but of
Palestine.
21 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10, n. 5, citing many cases.
80 Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 125 P. 812, 43 L. R. A., N. S. 240
(1912) ; State v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921).
31Tennessee Coal, Iron and Rr. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354 (1914),
L. R. A. 1916 D 685.
1 Roller v. Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S. E. 172, (1912), L. R. A. 1915 F
984, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 1139; writ of err. dism., 234 U. S. 738; Chicago &
Alton R'd. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, (1877) (railroad charter
case) ; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912) (stockholders' liability
statute) ; Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. 'S. 531 (1915) ; Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544 (1925) ; Order of United Commercial Travelers
of America v. Wolfe, 326 U. S. 712 (1946) ; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunken, 266 U. 1S.389 (1924) ; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S.
178 (1936) ; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935).
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public policy of the forum; . . . or because the liability
imposed is deemed a penal one."3
Thus, laws giving rise to a right of action for death by
the wrongful act of another probably have no force and
effect beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts
them, except by comity of the other states-a comity which
may be denied in whole or in part, as evidenced by the
panorama herein presented of the law of Maryland on the
subject in the past decade.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF A NAVIGABLE
BOUNDARY RIVER
Barnes v. State'
Appellant who claimed to be a resident and voter of the
state of Virginia, was indicted by the grand jury of Prince
George's County, Maryland for committing rape on a citizen of Virginia. The crime took place on a steamboat running on the Potomac River en route from Norfolk, Virginia
to Washington, D. C. and passing through Prince George's
County, although at the time of the crime the evidence
showed that the boat was in the waters of adjacent Charles
County.
Appellant filed a plea to the jurisdiction to which the
State's demurrers were sustained. The appellant was then
tried and convicted. After conviction he filed a motion in
arrest of judgment but this was overruled and he was sentenced to be hanged. The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment without costs and a petition for writ of certiorari
was
2
denied by the United States Supreme Court.
31 Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 160 (1932), cited in Fuller,
Trustee v. Rock, 125 Ohio St. 36, 180 N. E. 367 (1932); See also Ross,

supra, n. 25.

On the subject of penal statutes, it might be pointed out that Robinson
v. Norato, 71 R. I. 256, 43 A. (2d) 467 (1945) (overruled on other grounds
by Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947)), held that a statute allowing
triple damages to the complainant for overceiling charges by a vendor of
goods was a penal statute in the international sense. It is submitted that
this is a departure from the accepted concept of what constitutes a penal
statute in that sense. The Testa case specifically refused to rule on the
point.
-Since the limitation in that statute under consideration is procedural, it
effectively bars application of the effect of a substantive right under a
foreign statute that might otherwise be recognized by Maryland.
147

A. (2d) 50 (Md. 1946).

* Barnes v. State of Md., 329 U. S. 754 (1946).

